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I
DAPHNE MARLATT and bpNichol have both been critically cele- brated for the writerly qualities of their work, and in the  1980s both were explicated in vocabularies that borrowed significant-
ly from poststructuralist and French feminist theory respectively. Yet both
have also been reproached for perpetuating discredited positions: Nichol
for the retention of a humanist subjectivity and imperialist narrative of
nation; Marlatt for feminist essentialism. I have chosen to consider them
together because of the similarity in critical response to the so-called hu-
manist elements in their work, and because I hear this response as typi-
cal of a literary-theoretical reaction to writing that reenacts perceptual
experience. The two major critiques that have come out about their work
to date are epistemological — the “essentialism rap” as Marlatt calls it
(Readings 128) — and postcolonial or cross-cultural. I want to suggest
that both critical streams misrecognize the kind of subjectivity proposed
by the process poetics that Nichol and Marlatt practice. Using a distinc-
tion of Giorgio Agamben’s, I argue that Nichol and Marlatt assume the
position of the subject who undergoes rather than the subject who knows,
but that it is the latter to which critics have addressed themselves. This
is not to say that the assumptions which produce the subject of experi-
ence are beyond contest, but rather that they have yet to be adequately
explored. Because my focus is on the poetic performance of experience,
I will be considering Marlatt and Nichol at a level of abstraction that may
seem to overstep the considerable differences between them in method
and content. What I hope to gain by this generalizing approach is a way
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to reframe the critical response to the perceptual, performative dimension
of process poetry, and to suggest how such writing might speak to us now.
The one point most readers acknowledge about both Nichol and
Marlatt is that each combines easily recognizable themes and cultural
narratives with strongly foregrounded textual play. In The Martyrology,1
Nichol pursues themes of identity (who is “i”?), of nation building (where
is here?), of historical narration (how do i tell a life?), and of social rela-
tions (how does “i” get from me to we?). These themes are very loosely
assembled under a quest motif and enacted by a cast of characters that in-
cludes the saints (the “st” words of the language) and a lowercase, first
person narrator who finds himself adrift in a vast word world. As the “i”
traverses this world in a search for self, relationship, and home, it faces
fear, death, and loneliness. Those readers who have sought to position The
Martyrology with the help of postmodern or poststructuralist theory have
set Nichol’s dazzling repertoire of textual devices against this narrative
and its diminutive subject. In “The Martryology as Paragram,” a key es-
say on Nichol in North of Intention (1986), Steve McCaffery begins with
a recognition of two economies in the work: the syntactic, or “material or-
der of language” (58), and the semantic, which gives us the “idealist effects
of language” (59). In the same essay, McCaffery writes that Nichol’s
“dialogism provides us with a contemporary access to The Martyrology not
as a serial epic or poetic journal, but as a polyphonic staging of intersect-
ing texts in which inter-subjectivity (undeniably present) is never allowed
to dominate, and needs, in its relative status, no apologetic justification”
(75-76). Stephen Scobie, in bpNichol: What History Teaches (1984), also
identifies contrary tensions in the work and positions Nichol between
modernist humanism and deconstruction (9). Smaro Kamboureli, writing
on Nichol’s construction of the self in “Self/Identity/Pronoun: bpNichol”
(1991), notes that while Nichol cannot get rid of the “I,” the “apostrophic
mode” of The Martyrology establishes the con-stitutive role of the other
in the engendering of the self and thus decentres it (162). Douglas
Barbour, in his contribution to the ECW Press critical series on Canadian
literature (1992), reads Nichol’s writing as “a form of ‘écriture,’” but agrees
with Scobie that “‘while Nichol has moved boldly into the field of
decentred writing, he is also, and still, a major instance of the presence
of voice in poetry’” (Canadian 282).
Other readers, however, most of them from a younger generation of
critics, have not been similarly convinced that textual density adequately
qualifies the narrative component of The Martyrology. Those who read the
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 poem as epistemologically naïve argue that the wordplay is recovered at
the thematic level, or that Nichol fails to deconstruct the narrator as pres-
ence. Peter Jaeger’s assessment of The Martyrology as recuperative of the
humanist subject exemplifies this kind of response. In ABC of Reading
TRG (1999), Jaeger writes that “The Martyrology’s inscription of a speak-
ing ‘I’, along with its use of journalistic form, recuperates a self-present
subject at the thematic level.… Nichol’s longpoem offers readers the com-
forting assurances of a de-politicized, atheoretical humanism that is only
partially de-stabilized by the ramifications of its own formal procedures”
(35).
To Jaeger’s reservations and those of others similarly disposed to-
ward The Martyrology — Jeff Derksen, Darren Wershler-Henry, and
Christian Bök, for example2 — postcolonial readers have added their
own. In an essay included in the collection, Beyond the Orchard (1997),3
Glen Lowry finds in Nichol an idea of community that simply repeats the
liberal pluralism of the official culture in which the juridicial and histori-
cal subjects are taken to be the same (68). Moreover, Lowry argues that
Book 5 of The Martyrology, which details the poet’s rediscovery of his
geohistorical environs in Toronto and other sites, is thematically tied to
British Romanticism, Wordsworth’s in particular. Drawing on the “great
image bank of European culture” (71), Nichol, like British and European
settlers in Canada, whites out indigenous culture. Other contributors to
the Orchard also find that Nichol unself-consciously inscribes white privi-
lege. Mark Nakada suggests that the alphabetic letter, on which the para-
grammatic radicalism4 of The Martryology depends, is not, in fact,
culturally neutral or ahistorical. Louis Cabri also argues that Nichol re-
lies on the supposed neutrality of the alphabetic letter to open up a utopic
and ahistorical space of writing. Kate Foster finds in Nichol’s idea of
community traces of Therafields, the group therapy organization in
which Nichol lived and worked, and which she reads as marked by cul-
tural homogeneity (white and middle-class). For these readers, existential
generalization in The Martyrology serves to veil an unacknowledged im-
perialist and patriarchal history that lives on in the poem.
Readings of Marlatt follow an analogous pattern. Expositions that
support the work find there a dense word play that decentres the subject
and constitutes a revisionary form of narration through which Marlatt
engages in a quest for a female/feminist identity, for social and ecologi-
cal justice, for the lesbian body, and for an originary female/feminist
homeplace. In a seminal essay for this critical line, Barbara Godard in
“‘Body I’: Daphne Marlatt’s Feminist Poetics” (1985), finds in Marlatt a
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writing of excess. The feminist subject that begins to emerge does not
trace itself to Lacanian lack, Godard says, but to a subjectivity closer to
that proposed by Nancy Chodorow and Julia Kristeva. This subject “has
less rigid ego boundaries and sees the world not as divisions and hierar-
chies but as an interconnected web” (489). Lianne Moyes, in “Writing,
the Uncanniest of Guests: Daphne Marlatt’s How Hug a Stone” (1991),
contributes to this view of Marlatt in an Irigarayan explication of the sta-
tus of the womb in How Hug as neither inside nor outside representation.
Janice Williamson, in “It gives me a great deal of pleasure to say yes:
Writing/Reading Lesbian in Daphne Marlatt’s Touch to My Tongue”
(1991), draws on a wide range of key feminist sources (Irigaray, Wittig,
de Lauretis, Fuss, Kristeva, Meese, and Gallop, for instance) to describe
lesbian desire in Marlatt’s writing and the invention of “an embodied
language” (182). Pamela Banting, in Body, Inc.: A Theory of Translation
Poetics (1995), argues that Marlatt translates between the semiotics of the
body and symbolic language, letting the former alter the latter: “Marlatt
collapses dialectics and brings different dialects and different bodies into
play,” she says. “Bodies and lovemaking alter language” (187).
Critiques of the work, although fewer than those directed to Nichol,
similarly point to thematic recuperation of the textual play, to an essen-
tialist feminism that seeks to ground itself outside language, and to the
overstepping of other differences such as race in the validation of
“woman” as the operative political signifier of the text. As with Nichol,
the reservations take the form of either epistemological or cultural cri-
tique, and both focus on Marlatt’s alleged naturalization of gender bina-
ries. The two major proponents of an essentialist reading of Marlatt are
Lola Lemire Tostevin and Frank Davey. In “Writing in the Space that Is
Her Mother’s Face,” (1989, 1995), Tostevin hears Marlatt’s texts as re-
cuperative or “vulvalogocentric” (Subject 201). She suggests that “While
the radical re-writing and rereading of dominant forms aspire to the dis-
placement of master narratives, whether they be historical, mythological
or literary, many women may find solutions to complex social problems
limited if confined to the reproductive or sexual spheres or, for that mat-
ter, to a segregated society” (Subject 201). Frank Davey also makes a se-
rious case for Marlatt’s essentialism in his “Words and Stones in How Hug
a Stone” (1989, 1994). Davey argues that How Hug orbits a transcenden-
tal signified that limits the play of the text. For Tostevin and Davey,  Mar-
latt’s writing is recuperative,5 and for reasons parallel to those of critics
who find that Marlatt does not adequately acknowledge differences of
race or class. One of the most extended and carefully balanced studies of
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Marlatt from a postcolonial and cross-cultural perspective comes in
Wendy Plain’s unpublished MA thesis on Ana Historic, defended at
Simon Fraser University in June 1996.6 While Plain suggests that
Marlatt’s construction of the feminist subject in this novel replicates “the
invisibility of First Nations women in conventional feminist paradigms”
(79), she also acknowledges the “interlocking system of vulnerabilities and
hierarchies” (91) that mark differences of sex, class, and race in the text
and complicate the gender binary that haunts it.
If I may rephrase the question raised by these commentaries, the
issue in the critical construction of both Nichol and Marlatt is whether
the net effect of the text is productive or recuperative. By productive I
refer to a process of multiplying linkages akin to rhizomatic “becomings”
as these have been explicated by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: the
narrative line is complicated through an excess of connectives, to the
point where it begins to change form. By recuperative, I mean the pos-
sibility that this proliferation of connections may be subordinated to a
linear narrative, or a foundational signified. The section titled “Imperfec-
tion: A Prophecy” in Nichol’s Book Six Books of The Martyrology illus-
trates the duplicity in question. This section contains some of Nichol’s
most conventional themes and narratives. Two obscure apostles of the Bi-
ble, Adronicus and Junias, and the apocryphal giant Buamundus, who
appears in The Lost Literature of Medieval England, wander through Brit-
ain, converting pagans to Christianity. In their later years, they set sail for
a rumoured land that turns out to be Canada. On these journeys of dis-
covery, our heroes meditate on their mortality and insignificance in re-
lation to the capital “L” Lord they pray to (“i have understood so little
Lord in my cringing smallness” (n.pag.), while the narrative voice remarks
on the scenery, and tells jokes and stories, a typical Nichol way of pass-
ing the time on a long textual trip: Buamundus, because of his size is
“BOO!! / set a scare / AMONG US.” Or in one theory about the voyage,
Buamundus wants out and becomes “BUAMOUTNDUS.” Read against
the grain, this journey constitutes a quest narrative that is clearly Euro-
entric and imperialistic, despite the folksy wordplay, since our travellers
wind up in the “new” world. Moreover, the passages of prayer are not
ironized in any way, and for some readers they will be too fraught with
a contaminated belief system to be audible as anything else. At the same
time, it is easy to show how the narrative has been reworked to underscore
the temporal, imperfect qualities of the historical narrative and its actors.
Nichol does not attempt to overcome this narrative he has inherited (in the
sense that one might “overcome” a metaphysics), but to crochet it into
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minoritarian7 status; it is too fussy, too indiscreet in its mixing of genres
and telling of little jokes, too much the cosmic doily, too feminine. Frayed
and fidgeted in this manner, the old masculinist quest narrative begins to
unravel, and connections to mundane genres like the diary or the cross-
word puzzle begin to form. The text is becoming something else in a
manner that perhaps more accurately reflects the ways in which cultural
beliefs and practices actually change — through misdirection and friction
— rather than through the immediate cognitive liberation that theory
appears to make available.
Marlatt’s quest narratives are similarly wrought upon, although by
means of different strategies. In Zócalo, for instance, a story about a couple
vacationing in Mexico, the female tourist finds herself shut out from a
culture that is not hers and is forced to see herself as a foreigner in the eyes
of locals. A passage that tells of her photographing passersby and vendors
on a seawall turns into a meditation on the gaze: the telephoto lens becomes
an “impertinent accessory to the act of her seeing” (10). Focussing on a
vendor, she finds
his dark glance … is both for her & at her, a not knowing he can’t
quite tear himself away from but continues to sit staring suspiciously
from around & behind several intervening backs, the closest of
which, so close despite their mutual silence, turns finally & says,
you’re snooping, that’s what you like about that lens isn’t it, that’s
what it allows you to do. (10)
What happens here as the scene unfolds is the complexification of a set
of clichéd relationships: white middle-class tourist photographs local
exotica; first world objectifies, patronizes, and exploits the third. But this
familiar script is complicated by a gender binary that cuts across race and
class. The orange vendor about to be photographed poses “for her” but
also looks “at her.” This exchange is further complicated by the presence
of the male companion of the female tourist, who accuses her of “snoop-
ing,” an activity that implies curiosity and intrusion but might also sug-
gest a certain suspension of judgment. Only if we hold tourist and vendor
to cultural scripts outside the text at hand can we be sure about the quality
of the gaze that passes between them. For a brief moment the gender, race,
and class categories that make up this socially assigned script are set vi-
brating against each other and against the particularities of the three peo-
ple involved, with the result that tourist and orange-vendor shift between
subject and object positions.
This scene opens and closes like a camera shutter in a text where one
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micro-event flows into the next, pushed by paragraph length, run-on sen-
tences that move incrementally through a global experience of sight,
sound, and intellect. The small variations Marlatt introduces to the scripts
she inhabits accumulate within and between texts. In How Hug a Stone,
for instance, the poem that Frank Davey has used to demonstrate
Marlatt’s essentialism, there are the macho imaginings of the narrator’s
son, which Davey hears as confirming gender roles. These sections attrib-
uted to the son, however, are positioned inside the mother’s narrative, and
are distinguished generationally from hers in tone. The boy’s extravagant
make-believe, as opposed to the narrator’s “real life” story, implies a re-
versal of the clichéd gender scripting where the woman fantasizes, dreams,
makes things up, while the man takes care of the real world — a script
that Marlatt confronts explicitly when she comes to write Ana Historic.
In Narrative in the Feminine (2000), Susan Knutson makes this point
about Marlatt’s subversive use of traditional narrative forms in far greater
detail than I can engage here: Knutson, in a narratological reading of How
Hug a Stone, shows that Marlatt thematizes the quest narrative in order
to transform it through complication.8 As in the passage from Nichol, the
given cultural script in Marlatt’s texts frays into a more complex set of
connections.
II
Another way to frame this question of the contrary tensions in the work
of Nichol and Marlatt — the productive and recuperative components
— is to say that both of these poets write from experience, if I can stretch
that term to mean response to various mediating regimes as well as per-
ceptual and proprioceptive impressions. While each came out of differ-
ent poetic communities, Nichol from concrete and sound poetry, and
Marlatt from the process poetics of Charles Olson, Robert Duncan,
Denise Levertov, and TISH,9 both of these communities of the 50s and
60s sought to revise the status of knowledge. The concrete poem mate-
rializes page and grapheme, or sound and rhythm, breaking up the seman-
tic component of language and positioning its elements in time-space: it
is a site where new linkages and agrammatical alignments may come into
play, rather than a discourse primarily intended to develop key concepts
or renew cultural paradigms. At this level of abstraction, concrete is akin
to process poetics. Both of these poetries have been read as a push for
unmediated knowing, concrete because the fusion of form and content
in some versions of it suggests a transparent language, and process poetry
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for similar reasons: because the emphasis on sense impressions and em-
bodied speech has seemed to propose direct apprehension. What I want
to emphasize, however, is that both concrete and process poetry reimagine
knowledge as an affective act: they express knowing as experience, and
experience as a mode of knowing. This is humanism, as critics have com-
plained, but it is humanism repeated with a difference.
I read Charles Olson’s The Special View of History (1970) as a vital
document for poetries of the era, even those such as concrete that are quite
removed from Olson’s project, because his work thematizes the postwar
effort to de-reify the metaphysical tradition and create a poetics of the
embodied and historically situated. In The Special View, Olson argues that
myth, when it becomes “‘what is said,’” dissolves into an historical act,
and history, Olson says, is “‘finding out for oneself’” (20). It is a record
of sayings and doings as opposed to a description of reality as such. This
new humanism (Olson’s “human universe”) was meant to place “knowl-
edge” in quotations, or better, reposition it as a practice, rather than an
authoritative tradition, or what deconstructive philosophy would later call
an ontotheology. Olson’s touchstones in The Special View are Keats’s
negative capability and Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, both of which
he quotes approvingly as having returned knowledge to the material world
from its misplacement in a transcendental realm of certainty.
At mid-century, however, this bid to rethink knowledge as experi-
ence and experience as the root act of knowing came at a time when the
nature and validity of experience had already long been at issue in phi-
losophies ranging from phenomenology to the eclectic thinking of Walter
Benjamin.10 In his recent history of the theme, Giorgio Agamben locates
the end of experience in the Renaissance, with the founding of modern
science. The displacement of the senses through prosthetics and the con-
nection of God and man through the emanationist mysticism of the Neo-
platonists helped lay the groundwork for the Cartesian cogito (20): the
subject who knows, rather than the subject who undergoes. This distinc-
tion Agamben finds in Greek drama, in which he sees a clear division be-
tween human and divine knowledge: human knowledge means “what is
learned only through and after suffering, and excludes any possibility of
foresight” (19); certainty, in contrast, is a divine prerogative. Agamben’s
account of the emergence of the subject of knowledge thus complements
Olson’s complaint that post-Platonic philosophy and science (scientism)
constitute a misguided claim to certainty. The philosophical history of-
fered in Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience (1993)
suggests a context for Olson’s delight in mid-century developments in
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quantum physics (Heisenberg), linguistics (Benjamin Lee Whorf), and
philosophy (Alfred North Whitehead) that announced the collapse of
objectivity.
Of course, neither Olson nor his peers have fared particularly well
with critics on this project. Since the 1970s and the continental critique
of phenomenology, the major theoretical objection to a writing of expe-
rience has been epistemological.11 What Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, De-
leuze, Kristeva and the American deconstructionists have argued in
different ways is that consciousness is a derivative sociolinguistic product
that is out of phase with itself. It thus has the status of a symptom or ef-
fect rather than a cause, and is constituted by various regimes that it can-
not master (language, history, or social position for instance). The effect
of these continental arguments has been to shift attention away from the
contents and operations of consciousness to the process of its production
from mediating systems. The critic’s job is therefore to make plainer the
determinants of experience rather than to trace its trajectories: to search
out blind spots where ideology is received as common sense, or shatter the
mirror that offers an imaginary self. The writing that has developed along-
side this theory often has moved away from narrative, since story belongs
to an expressive tradition that is open to skepticism the moment ex-
perience can no longer be taken as spontaneous. Yet the poetic effort to
reimagine knowledge as undergoing rather than knowing was directed
against the same epistemological realism targeted by continental phi-
losophy.
What then, is particular about the writerly subject of experience? Is
it distinguishable from the substantive self and the old humanism, and if
it is, how does it differ from the deconstructed presence?
Undergoing implies that the subject is always immersed in some-
thing — labour, life, and language, Foucault says — on which she has no
exteriority. In process poetics, this condition is figured through the ret-
rospective nature of form; form unfolds behind the poet as s/he moves
through a poem or a life, rather than before her as a thesis to be explicated.
Only as the poem approaches its end — the end of the poet’s life in the
case of the life-long poem — does the form begin to emerge and then only
for others, rather than the one who has lived it and will never see the
whole of it. To say this another way, the origin, when origin has the
poststructuralist meaning of full presence, is ahead: it is always deferred
to the future where it is virtual, rather than actual as it is taken to be in
the metaphysical tradition. Hence, the readerly quality of process poetry
(the writer reads her own writing) and the absence of reflexive devices that
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distance and ironize. The poet is finding out as he goes along, as it were,
and in this mode, the writer cannot grasp the groundlessness of her own
work. The death of the subject in the symbolic, the immanence of past
and future, or the virtual whole of work, mark the advent of the Other
in relation to the poet’s I-voice because they cannot be undergone. In
contrast, the deconstructive point — that the trace of the Other inhab-
its all that a work can bring to presence — has validity at the conceptual
level where the Idea, according to its metaphysical history, endures
through every instantiation. Here deconstruction does its work by expos-
ing the materiality of the Idea. When the poet approaches the materiality
of the Idea intuitively, however, it appears as a polarized Other. The sub-
ject of experience can think its own death, but cannot consciously live it,
nor can it bring to awareness the whole of the symbolic in every nomi-
nation. Process poetry thus offers a point of view, rather than ironic re-
flexivity; it records the perspective of a diminished, fallible subject who
cannot give an authoritative account of itself, let alone the whole of the
virtual past that inheres in it as a languaged being. From this perspective,
ideological biases can neither be dispelled nor forgiven; rather, the ethos
of the work lies in the poet’s effort to expand and clarify the point of view
as much as possible, and to mark the narrating voice as a locus of affects
and apprehensions rather than as a knower.
For Olson, this perspectivism meant Alfred North Whitehead, and
there are some key Whiteheadian points in his poetics that help to clarify
the reimagining of experience in the poetry circles Olson influenced. In
the atomic universe of Process and Reality, the minims of which are mat-
ter-energy units that Whitehead calls “actual entities,” organisms take
shape by responding to their surrounds through positive or negative pre-
hension; they do or do not take in other actual entities. In this manner,
the entities form more complex assemblages, ranging from simple organ-
isms and compounds to those with consciousness. Every actual entity,
Whitehead says, is connected to every other one in the universe either
positively or negatively, and the aim of the whole process is the maxi-
mization of creativity and complexity through novel combinations. Any
assemblage, in that it is composed of a series of positive and negative
prehensions, can be understood as a point of view or perspective on the
universe as a whole since it constitutes a particularized expression of the
data it has prehended. In this schema, Whitehead’s God takes the place of
the ultimate point of view or metaposition that cannot be occupied by
any entity in the universe. As “outside,” however, He is paradoxically no-
where else but in the world. In what Whitehead calls His consequent as-
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pect, God is the totality of existents at any one time; in his primordial na-
ture, he is virtual, rather than actual, and represents the maximum poten-
tial for complexity of each entity. In this virtual aspect, God is a “lure for
feeling,” or urge in each thing to maximize its linkages and hence its ex-
pressive potential. As Deleuze says, in his reading of this Leibniz-White-
head construct in The Fold, every unit (monad or actual entity) expresses
the whole universe, but not all of it with equal clarity (25). Each entity,
then, “wants” to enlarge its “clear zone.”12
In my view, Whitehead’s cosmology cannot be read for truth or
falsehood; it functions better as an abstract model of potential relations
than as an empirical account of the universe, for which it manifestly will
not serve. In the abstract, however, it suggests much. First, the White-
headian entity forms itself affectively, through ongoing response. Such a
process would not leave us with a unified subject or an uncritical accept-
ance of experience as somehow more authentic than other ways of know-
ing. Instead, it suggests that experiential agency is to be located in the
creative repetition and inflection of various regimes in which the subject
has been interpellated: linguistic, social, semiotic, chemical, biological,
geographical, cultural, or historical. Moreover, the noun does not precede
the verb in this narrative; there is no entity prior to the interactive event.
Actual entities, despite the name, are not objects but events. In process
poetics too, the subject emerges: it does not come to the process already
formed. Form is retrospective. Secondly, the terms subject and object
represent relative perspectives rather than ontological distinctions; that
which is a subject for itself is an object for others. In the subject position,
the entity is sublime in its virtual linkages; it expresses the whole universe,
either positively or negatively by taking it in, or not, and it is thus com-
plex and indeterminate beyond capture. In its sublime aspect, the subject
cannot be intuitively experienced, and it is this aspect that suggests a
deconstruction of the “is” or whatness of being. Considered in its objec-
tive position, however, the subject is simply one perspective among many
and a datum for others; to extrapolate from Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz
and Whitehead, we might say that the actual is the clear zone of the sub-
ject — the small, finite zone of acts and attributes rather than the end-
less virtual universe the subject inflects, and which gives it creative
potential.
The figuring of these contrasting faces of the subject is key to the
difference between the subject of experience on the one hand, and on the
other, the disseminated presence, or even the Deleuzean desire toward
which my vocabulary has been moving. The emphasis in dissemination
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is on the temporality of languaged beings, such that every presence is pro-
duced and accompanied by a virtual chain of signifiers that prevents full
disclosure (we might say every signifier is connected to every other one
in the language and that all virtually coinhere in each). In the Deleuzean
empirical formulation, the focus is again on a virtual, dispersed subject
that multiplies its linkages rather than the (partially) reterri-torialized
subject that acts in finite, stratified space. These critical strategies, I have
argued, target the subject who knows; they undermine the unity of the
subject at the cognitive level. However, neither deconstruction nor
Deleuzean desire actually take us beyond the double tension between the
apparitional presence and its virtual past — between stratified and
smooth space,13 or the semiotic and symbolic. The subject who undergoes
figures this tension differently; it others its own sublime indeterminacy.
On this point, Zizek’s argument with deconstruction is instructive. Zizek
claims that skepticism, because it refuses positionality, functions like a
metalanguage. In contrast, he offers Lacan’s real as the impossible-to-
occupy metaposition that appears along with the subject.14 But can we
not see variant constructions of the subject here? If deconstruction targets
the subject who knows, competing theories, such as the Lacanian, offer
a subject who thinks it knows, but actually undergoes, who misrecognizes
itself, and is therefore unwittingly determined by an Other (the symbolic
order, its own death) that it can neither avoid nor intuitively master. The
feminist revision of Lacan, as exemplified by Irigaray’s rethinking of lack
in tropes of fluidity, is closer to the poetic in that it allows the subject a
way of thinking other than the skepticism of deconstruction or the naïve
belief attributed to it by psychoanalysis. Thinking becomes affective re-
sponse rather than cognitive grasp: like Shakespeare’s Gloucester, we learn
to see feelingly and to similar effect.
What makes the new humanism differ from the old, then, as well as
from the disseminated presence, is the double. Foucault announced it as
the “unthought” in The Order of Things (326), but it is my contention
that this elusive double has taken various forms — Other, God, lack, real,
impossible, virtual — in the critical streams that have circulated since
mid-century. By this I do not mean to imply that all these names reduce
to the same signified; they alter the significance of the signifying chain
rather than anchor it,15 and as the feminist response to Lacan shows, the
social and political stakes in figuring the Other are high. As an abstract
relation, however, the Other distinguishes the subject who undergoes
from the one who knows.
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III
If we take the subject in Nichol and Marlatt to be a subject of experience,
and form to be retrospective, then another reading of these poets begins
to emerge which does not depend so much on which component of the
work, the productive or recuperative, is thought to dominate. First, the
apparently metaphysical components of their work take on a different
significance. Prayer in The Martyrology serves as a positioner; it under-
scores the smallness of the narrative voice inside a language world it has
not mastered, but it also rises up with that voice as the evocation of the
Other and the place of the impossible. The functional transcendence of
Nichol’s “Lord” is part of the structure of experience. In a passage from
Book 5, Chain 3, that Frank Davey hears as confirming the presence of
a transcendental signified (“Eggs” 49), Nichol writes:
you tolerate them Lord
the many guises of your signifiers
know you are the signified. (n.pag.)
As the position that cannot be occupied, the signified presented here has
an epistemological meaning (the impossibility of certainty for the
signifiers), but it also has a practical one. In an earlier section of Book 5,
Nichol writes:
selfish is where the self is H
attains that link between the ones
forms llord
the mahayanna view
having reached a point of unity with heaven or with God
we must place ourselves
again
        into the world
forward is a for world stance
the human thing to do (Chain 3 n.pag.)
When, in a skeptical culture, we assume that what we know must be the
whole of what there is to know because there is no transcendent realm, we
absorb the impossible and assume a “point of unity with heaven or with
god.” The self takes on “the link between the ones”; it makes itself respon-
sible for the syntax of the world in a move that naturalizes a historical,
human universe. The crosspiece of the letter “H” (the “cross”), is what
connects and separates the “ones,” visually the two vertical marks of the
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letter. With the elimination of the horizontal mark, the “ones” collapse into
the lowercase “l,” the first letter of “lord” or the number one. “Number one”
thus takes the place of the uppercase “Lord” and the ones move into the
place of the impossible. The play of letters here suggests that to collapse the
ones into “llord” in this manner, is to deify consciousness. Nichol urges that
the human thing to do — the adjective conjures its absent other, the sa-
cred — is to “place ourselves / again / into the world,” to accept mortality.
Another way to read the crosspiece of the “H” is as death, and in fact, death
is implicit in the Christian word play. The visual message of the letter “H”
is that the crosspiece which separates the ones, and which therefore gives
them form or “life” lays (itself) down. The phonic message is held in the
fact that the letter “H” is articulated by the expulsion of breath.
The ongoing thematizing of death throughout The Martyrology
urges the imminent suspension of the adventuring “i” and serves, along
with prayer, to index the heterogeneous Other of experience. But Nichol
also writes about pain, and here he offers an experience that cannot be
brought to cognition, rather than a concept that cannot be intuitively
imagined. In an untitled poem collected in gIFTS, beginning with the line
“wandered the streets of downtown Berkeley” (n.pag.), Nichol wrestles
with the disjunction between undergoing and knowing. The poem is
about the pain in the speaker’s leg and seems to invite a reading of it as
autobiographical representation: the pain Nichol lived with was a symp-
tom of the tumour that killed him. Representation, however, is immedi-
ately swallowed in aporia. A pain can only be undergone; it cannot
become a communicable object of  knowledge. Hence, the poem circles
around and around its unsayability. First, the poet finds expression de-
flected in cliché: “the pain / ‘is sent to try us.’” Then, he attempts to esta-
blish an analogy between the “body [that] disintegrates” and language
with its “sure connectives gone.” But each time the poet speaks of pain,
he dramatizes the impossibility of turning his experience of it into knowl-
edge. Hence in the lines,  “hauling my leg up the hill / even as this line
drags every other line with it / the whole of the Martyrology trailing be-
hind” (n.pag), poetic feet attempt to carry an empirical leg, but instead
demonstrate the disjunction between knowing and undergoing. The
poem ends as lines (of poems) and waves (in a California harbour) “beat
at the shore of some knowing.” In the last line, the poet concludes that
body, pain, works, and days “simply are.” He gives them ontological sta-
tus, but, in the same breath, distinguishes being from knowing. In the
realm of experience, there is no way to avoid the ontological, any more
than there is to bring it to knowledge as full presence.
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Where Nichol writes the double as God, pain, or death, Marlatt
writes it as bliss. In an interview with George Bowering in 1979, she says,
“I’m really given to the sensual. I really delight in that. That’s why I can’t
get absorbed in the zero, in the blank. … language, you know, generates
itself & it dies, but it’s all there in the body, & that’s why I love the mu-
sic. Because the music is the physical quality of language” (Net Work 7).
As this comment suggests, Marlatt turns to the semiotic as a way of writ-
ing beyond the conceptual.16  In Ana Historic, for instance, a birth is
“mouth speaking flesh” (126), and the “who’s there?” question that ini-
tiates the narrator’s search for a self in this novel ends in a lesbian love
scene where the narrator speaks of “her on my tongue” (152). In a passage
that I cite for the image, Agamben remarks of Benveniste’s distinction
between the semiotic and semantic that the “semiotic is nothing other
than the pure pre-babble language of nature, in which man shares in or-
der to speak” (55). The semantic “like dolphins,” he says, “lifts its head
from the semiotic sea of nature” (56). In Marlatt’s texts, the semiotic laps
like water in and over the semantic, and cultural scripts that seemed to
be fixed begin to move.
At the heart of the “essentialism rap,” however, is the question of
whether Marlatt recoups the semiotic flow in foundational tropes of an
originary female Other. Here She is in How Hug a Stone:
although there are stories about her, versions of history that are
versions of her, & though she comes in many guises she is not a
person, she is what we come through to & what we come out of, ground
& source. the space after the colon, the pause (between the words) of all
possible relation. (182)
This passage parallels the one from Nichol’s Book 5 quoted above, which
says that the Lord is a signified with many signifiers, and I would argue
similarly that the u-topos of Marlatt’s texts is also a manifestation of the
impossible. However, the difference between Marlatt’s and Nichol’s han-
dling of the Other is the difference between a masculinist point of view
and the feminist transformation of it. The above passage in How Hug
lends itself to the kind of Irigarayan interpetation offered by Lianne
Moyes’s “Writing, the Uncanniest of Guests,” in which the womb be-
comes a third space, neither inside nor outside, that undoes the di-
chotomy of the sexual binary. In a recent elaboration of Deleuze’s reading
of Bergson, Dorothea Olkowski shows how this Irigarayan notion of the
third — the in-between, the interval — might be extended. In Bergson,
the interval lies between two kinds of becoming, perception and memory.
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In the pause is the possibility for creative reception, including the deter-
mination of sexual difference.17 As I have argued, Marlatt’s strategy con-
sists of constantly adjusting between memory and perception, of replaying
cultural scripts in order to fray and worry them into something else. But
the sublime in her work, the ocean of the semiotic immanent in every
relation and every articulation of presence, often slips into the place of the
impossible because it simply cannot be intuitively mastered: in relation
to the experiencing subject, it appears to be transcendent.
IV
I began by acknowledging a postcolonial critique as well as the epistemo-
logical one, and on the postcolonial, I can be briefer. It is not so easy to
make a dominant culture relative, historical, or malleable by declaration
as Olson wanted to do, nor is it easy to turn an uppercase “I” into lower-
case subjectivity,18 simply by pronouncement. This is why the double
tension in Nichol and Marlatt, between cultural givens and productive
becoming, seems important — not for radicalism of thought because
radical it is not — but because it offers a model of change that is not
simply cognitive. It shows how traditional cultural paradigms might be
made to shift through constant small adjustments. Yet I find no satisfac-
tory response to the complaint that the dominant culture’s concern with
itself has simply dominated, and continues to do so in all the various post-
modern strategies. Hence it is not just Nichol’s exploration of the colonial
settlement of Toronto’s Annex neighbourhood in Book 5, Chain 1, for in-
stance, that can be read as yet another whiting out of indigenous and non-
European cultures, but the whole effort to transform the quest narrative
as well. The same might be said for Marlatt’s exploration of her mother’s
history as a Mem, or of “woman” or “lesbian” as a political signifier. Be-
cause process poetics, and concrete as well, are rooted in a certain anti-
academicism of the era in which they emerged (a rebellion against the new
critics and the modernist well-wrought urn), because they were marginal
in relation to university sanctioned literatures of the day, and because the
subjectivities constructed in these poetries were and are mediated, it has
been relatively easy for practitioners to hear themselves as alternative or
even minor in the Deleuzean sense. However, with the heightened visibil-
ity of other cultural perspectives and postcolonial critiques of the domi-
nant, “alternative” has new connotations and we can better see process
poetry as belonging to the traditions from which it dissents.
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Yet membership in a dominant culture does not, I think, alter the
need to “affect the place from which we speak” in Zizek’s words (155; empha-
sis added), or to respond to the challenge implicit in process poetics,
which is that no amount of ironizing will secure a position in language
that is safe from reproach or free from responsibility. As subjects of ex-
perience, Nichol and Marlatt cannot do otherwise than write from where
they find themselves, and I have tried to show that this perspectivism may
offer advantages worthy of continuing consideration. In relation to the
practices of social othering that have given rise to the postcolonial,
skepticism usefully critiques the intellectual traditions that have enabled
them, but is not the critique also a refusal to identify with one’s own tra-
ditions? Even if complicity is acknowledged (there is always the caveat of
the introductory paragraph), must it not also be enacted? Strategies that
distance or ironize serve to protect the writer, who by such means attempts
to leap from the contested ground on which she stands. In the 1970s,
when feminist writers were struggling to articulate new subjectivities, the
subject as such came under erasure; in the 1980s and 1990s, when minor-
ity readers and writers emerged more prominently in academic and cul-
tural space, the mainstream population there quickly thinned in a rush
for the margins. Let’s call these displays of critical acumen knowing bet-
ter. But knowing better is not a satisfactory response to minorities who have
been injured by dominant practices, because it does not account for the af-
fective dimension of such practices. And if the cultural capital that has ac-
crued to theory has anything to do with its potential to liberate, then a segue
into the practical does not seem too much to ask.
We cannot, of course, go back to unelaborated experience. Narra-
tives that put forward minority points of view without troubling over how
that point of view gets produced, or how cultural and aesthetic forms can
put pressure on content, may end up merely flattering the cultural order
they are meant to challenge. A point of view, however, as it comes
through process poetics, is not quite the same as strategic essentialism.
The taking of provisional positions may still mean a one-way gaze or a
narrowly partisan position. The subject has to bracket itself, but within
the brackets, it functions as a specular identity: the gaze that travels out
toward the world along a predetermined trajectory is likely to return the
same way. The point of view in process poetries, however, suggests some
asymmetry. If, for itself, the subject is sublime in its virtuality — if it takes
up all the world from a particular angle — it is for others a datum; it does
not just take in the world but is also taken up, in the worlds of others.
This asymmetry is easy to see in Marlatt’s writing because she often turns
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to moments when the gaze of others unsettles the familiar, but without
giving up its own secrets. In Month of Hungry Ghosts, for instance, “Pam
wondered how people on the street regard white women (she herself
thinks English women look ‘dumpy’) & whether they found us sexual or
not, commented on the looks various people gave us. We both felt sepa-
rate & visible in our hired trisha pedalled by someone else” (93). Marlatt
multiplies such moments many times, but in addition to these, there are
the limit-experiences in both her texts and those of Nichol. These are the
points at which the I-voice has to face the impossible, the hole in its
world, as it were. Such moments hold open the writerly point of view so
it can never quite close into specular circularity, and the “hole” then be-
comes a point of entry for the gaze of others: it makes the world of the
poem porous, the mirror permeable. And what then comes through be-
gins to alter the script.
V
The process poetics I have traced here are only one way into the work of
Marlatt and Nichol, but then my purpose has been to retrieve an aspect
of their writing that I think has been neglected for polemical reasons. Not
only did process poetry collide with the coming of poststructuralism to
North American universities, but in Canada it arrived with the help of
American writers at a time when academics were pushing to foreground
Canadians and legitimize Canadian studies. What I think might be
gained from a rethinking of this poetics now are writerly strategies that
address the affective component of the contemporary cultural project,
which is devoted to change. However, I do not want to suggest that this
poetry is to be valued only for therapeutic reasons, or that it can be trans-
lated directly into a positive ethical or political agenda. The point of con-
nection between the practical and the aesthetic is in that zone of affect
where chance, choice, memory, and desire come into play and collision
with those same affective dimensions in the worlds of others. In Nichol,
the lowercase “i” constantly finds itself in new collocations with the other
letters where it loses its ability to possess order, and must instead try to
negotiate unexpected linkages and alignments in which it suddenly finds
itself interpellated. To yield to Nichol’s dreadful and contagious punning,
the imperial “I” has become an imp-in-peril, still capable of white mis-
chief, but smaller, weaker, more introspective, and already on its way to
becoming something else: becoming-woman, perhaps. In Marlatt, the
clear zone is a point of intersection with other worlds and therefore criss-
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crossed with trajectories that challenge response. This space is abstract —
not strictly formal and not yet practical either. It is not only aesthetic play
that goes on here, nor is it the laying down of a positive content, but the
“between” of relationship, where nothing or something might happen.
NOTES
1 I have confined my remarks to The Martyrology in this paper because it is this long
poem that has been most at issue for readers. Even those who prefer Nichol’s other works feel
some need to assert their value against that of The Martryology. Darren Wershler-Henry, for
instance, looks toward a “reassessment of Nichol’s other, ‘minor’ texts, which may, if we
invoke Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s use of the word, prove to be more important than
the ‘major’ one” (38).
2 See Jeff Derksen’s essay, “Mapping Mind, Mapping Frames: The Martyrology and Its
Social Text”; Wershler-Henry in “Argument for a Secular Martyrology” (cited above), and
Christian Bök in “Nickel Linoleum.”
3 Beyond the Orchard, edited by Roy Miki and Fred Wah, collects the work of two
graduate classes on Nichol’s Martyrology, held at Simon Fraser University (January to April
1995) and at the University of Calgary (September 1994 to April 1995). Conducted by Miki
and Wah, the seminars involved inter-university collaboration between the students. The
editors note in their Preface that “the students worked together on a writing and publication
project that would foster an open-ended critique of Tracing the Paths, a representative col-
lection of essays on The Martryology appearing only months before bp died” (5). Orchard,
then, is a response to the mostly favourable essays on Nichol in Paths, and to an older gen-
eration of Nichol readers. Beyond the Orchard was published as a special project (“An H
Project”) by West Coast Line, a journal for contemporary writing housed at Simon Fraser and
edited by Miki until 1999.
4 Steve McCaffery defines a paragram through this citation in his “The Martryology as
Paragram”:
A text is paragrammatic, writes Leon S. Roudiez, “in the sense that its organi-
zation of words (and their denotations), grammar, and syntax is challenged
by the infinite possibilities provided by letters or phonemes combining to
form networks of signification not accessible through conventional reading
habits …” (63).
For an exposition of reading strategies suited to Nichol’s paragrammatic texts, see
Pauline Butling’s essay, “bpNichol’s Gestures in Book 6 Books” in Tracing the Paths.
5 See also Julia Beddoes’s response to Frank Davey in her essay “Mastering the Mother
Tongue: Reading Frank Davey Reading Daphne Marlatt’s How Hug A Stone.”
6 I was the external examiner for Wendy Plain’s thesis and I have benefitted from her
work.
7 I use the word “minor” in the Deleuzean sense. A minor literature is a deterritorialized
writing within a major language. It is political in the sense that the individual is not under-
stood as an isolated consciousness, but as a junction within various social configurations (“ma-
chines”). Reda Bensmaia, in “On the Concept of Minor Literature,” writes of the minor that
“it is as if the system of ‘interpellations’ that works fully in the regime of ‘great literature’ no
longer works” (217). Marlatt and Nichol are not minor in this sense, but in different ways
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they push a major language toward the minor, Nichol by becoming-woman; Marlatt by
beginning to situate white as a colour.
8 Knutson shows that Marlatt both thematizes and complicates the quest narrative. She
argues that Marlatt adds secondary fabulas to the primary one; that she makes the principal
questor a collective, “gender-inclusive” subject; and that she juxtaposes mythic time to the
linear time of the quest. Knutson concludes “that although the fabula of How Hug a Stone can
be described as a quest, the narrative grammar of the quest cannot fully describe the events of
the poem. The inaccuracy of the quest model with respect to parent-child relationships points
to the patriarchal limitations of the model and perhaps of Western narrative itself” (59).
9 Marlatt’s association with TISH — with the American poets who influenced the
magazine and the group of young poets who initiated it (Frank Davey, Jamie Reid, George
Bowering, David Dawson, Fred Wah) — has come up on numerous occasions. See for in-
stance the interview with Brenda Carr in Beyond Tish, and Douglas Barbour’s introduction
to Marlatt in the ECW Canadian Writers and their Works series, especially pages 191-96.
10 Experience has been thematized extensively in twentieth-century philosophy, where
it appears as either Erlebnis or Erfahrung. Martin Jay summarizes: Erlebnis he says, is associ-
ated with “the immediacy of lived, prereflexive encounters between self and world privileged
by the tradition of Lebensphilosophie from Dilthey on”; Erfahrung is a “marker for the cumu-
lative wisdom over time produced by the interaction of self and world” (64).
11 On the poststructuralist response to experience, Jay notes that both Erlebnis and
Erfahrung were deemed inadequate: “The very quest for an authentic experience lost in the
modern world they [poststructuralists] damn as yet another version of the nostalgic yearn-
ing for a presence and immediacy that never has existed and never will” (64). For a particu-
larly unsympathetic poststructuralist reading of Olson, see the Olson section in Andrew Ross’s
The Failure of Modernism.
12 Whether entities “want” to (or should) maximize their complexity is a complicated
issue and one that lives on in Deleuzean studies. Whitehead constructs God in his virtual
aspect as a “lure for feeling,” or urge in each entity toward the maximizing of its potential.
Donald Sherburne explains:
God’s own aim in the creative advance is to have a world emerge of such
a sort that his own experience of that world will result in the greatest pos-
sible intensity in his own experience. He therefore … offers as a lure to each
actual entity as it arises that subjective aim the completion of which, in that
entity’s own concrescence, would create the kind of ordered, complex
world that, when prehended by God, would result in maximum intensity
of satisfaction for him. (227)
For Whitehead, “God” is the creative potential of things that tends toward complexity, and
the implication is that the process is “good”; for Deleuze, creativity is desire as active
deterritorializing force, different in kind from the reactive forces that give us the social regu-
lation of behaviour and therefore ill-suited to moral categories such as good and evil. An
expanded point of view does not necessarily translate to better social relations.
On the significance of desire, Dorothea Olkowski’s argument with Judith Butler is
instructive. Where Butler takes the view that Deleuzean desire constitutes unfounded meta-
physical speculation — Deleuze gives ontological status to a certain kind of desire and there-
fore engages in speculation that is implicated in metaphysics (as much so as Whitehead’s) —
Olkowski argues that active force “is there to a lesser or greater degree depending on the
history of the forces that have taken hold of that body (and so constitute it)” (46). Because
active and reactive forces differ in kind, the latter is not simply the oppression of the former,
nor is the former somehow more primordial (see Olkowski’s argument in Gilles Deleuze and
the Ruin of Representation (43-47)).
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Even if one accepts Olkowski’s argument, there is a problem in applying ontological
investigation to the social or political spheres and this problem is also present in process
poetics. The push to maximize linkages and extend complexity functions best at the level of
cosmology, where it is in terms of an imagined whole, not the local, that maximum inten-
sity is to be achieved. In Whitehead’s terms, it is God’s satisfaction that matters — but this
will hardly do as public policy. Robin Blaser, reading Olson reading Whitehead, notes that
Olson underlines a passage in Process and Reality which says, “The nature of evil is that the
characters of things are mutually obstructive” (82). The comment implies that some may
maximize their potential at the expense of others. In Olson’s case, as Tom Clark’s biography
suggests (Charles Olson: The Allegory of a Poet’s Life, 1991) the maximizing of complexity as
exemplified by the poet’s wide ranging interests (the curricula he assigned to himself and to
poet-companions), often took place at the expense of friends and particularly women who
were expected to provide practical support.
Nichol and Marlatt, however, handle the push for complexity differently. Nichol al-
ways returns the first person to its diminutive status, behaving more like a tourist in his own
expanding world than sublime subject. A tourist, of course, may be in a position of economic
and social privilege in relation to the indigene, but not in terms of knowing the other. Marlatt
takes up the tourist position literally; on the trips she records, the challenge is to open the
narrator’s perspective to others but not to absorb them. Different worlds intersect with hers
in potentially obstructive ways, and this means that the contact zone  — the clear zone —
becomes fraught, a place for negotiation, and for the reimagination of positions. It is possi-
ble to read in both writers an effort to maximize complexity, and also leave room for others,
but this is a kind of utopianism that seems congenial to the liberal status quo, especially if
we try to extend the gesture into the practical.
13 The distinction between smooth and stratified space comes from Deleuze’s “Trea-
tise on Nomadology” (A Thousand Plateaus). Deleuze is discussing the science of fluids: “The
model is a vortical one; it operates in an open space throughout which things-flows are dis-
tributed, rather than plotting out a closed space for linear and solid things. It is the differ-
ence between a smooth (vectorial, projective, or topological) space and a striated (metric)
space” (361-62). In the former, things spread; in the latter, they move from point to point:
the difference is that between an ontology of fluids and one of substance.
14 Speaking of deconstruction, Zizek argues that “the position from which the
deconstructivist can always make sure of the fact that ‘there is no metalanguage’; that no
utterance can say precisely what it intended to say; that the process of enunciation always
subverts the utterance; is the position of metalanguage in its purest most radical form” (154-
55). What this means in the political sphere is that one must proceed without the protection
of irony. For instance, “the point is that if we (the Party) say directly to the fighting work-
ers: ‘It does not matter if you fail, the main point of your struggle is its educational effect on
you’, the educational effect will be lost” (84).
15 I have in mind Zizek again. What he calls “quilting” refers to the binding of signifiers
through “nodal points” that then give identity to an ideological field. So feminism or Marx-
ism, for instance, offer coherent discourses, but the same social field could be differently
bound because there is no ultimate tie to a signified (See “‘Che Vuoi’” in The Sublime Object
of Ideology (87-129)). Zizek’s most interesting suggestion is that the nodal point matters; one
must proceed as if it could be grounded.
16 Pamela Banting argues the importance of the semiotic in Marlatt’s writing. See Body,
Inc.: A Theory of Translation Poetics (1995).
17 See Olkowski, in a segment called “Interval” from the chapter “Against Phenomenol-
ogy” in her Ruin of Representation (83-88), where she explicates her contention that “the ‘in-
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terval’ between perception and memory, intelligence and social life, is decisive for humans,
according to both Irigaray and Bergson” (83).
18 In Month of Hungry Ghosts, Marlatt draws attention to her lowercase “i”:
& I see (just as I stands for the dominant ego in the world when you is not
capitalized), that i want too much, just as, a child, i wanted affection.
Growing sense of myself as a Westerner wanting, wanting — experience
mostly. (100)
This move is necessary to the ethos of Marlatt’s work, yet insufficient by itself to bring about
the desired result; the large western “I” cannot be made to disappear by fiat, nor does Marlatt
seem to hold such expectations.
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